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ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE IN CROATIA AND MACEDONIA: INSTITUTIONAL CREATION AND 
EVOLUTION 
Introduction
*
 
This paper takes an explicitly historical focus.  It considers the h ?ƐŝŵƉĂĐƚŽŶƚŚĞfoundation and 
initial development of new modes of environmental governance in Croatia and Macedonia. A core 
assumption is that we cannot understand current and future developments without understanding 
their foundations. Creating an environmental governance acceptable to the EU called for radical 
change in governance and the development of new capacitites and capabilities in government and 
civil society. This was a substantial governance load and it is important to understand how states 
created the institutions to deal with this load. 
ŶĞǆƉůŝĐŝƚŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞŽĨƚŚĞŽƌŝŐŝŶĂůƉƌŽũĞĐƚŽŶǁŚŝĐŚƚŚŝƐƉĂƉĞƌŝƐďĂƐĞĚǁĂƐƚŽĞǆƉůŽƌĞƚŚĞh ?Ɛ
transformative power in polities where the gap between what the EU required and what existed was 
wide and where, because of enlargement, a major power asymmetry existed. Enlargement 
necessarilly promotes hierarchy (authoritative decisions by national authorities who are also 
responsible for implementation) because accession requires capable states able to transpose acquis 
and disburse effectively EU funds to projects and ensure their implementation. However, statehood 
in the Western Balkans is recognised as having serious weaknesses that impact on the process of 
European integration (Börzel 2013: 177-183). The participation of non-state actors can slow this 
process and even be seen as obstructive and, moreover, they frequently lack the capacities and 
capabilities to engage in policy formation and implementation. Prima facie, then, there seems to be 
little reason to include non-state actors. However, the EU aspires to promote partnership working in 
                                                             
*
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networks involving central and sub-national governments, civil society, and the wider public; 
moreover, environment policy requires extensive involvement by a wide range of public and private 
bodies. Two factors favour of inclusion: first, the EU regards the involvement of non-state actors 
(and therefore the creation of networks) as good in itself and, second, because environmental policy 
is technically complex and politically sensitive their involvement will improve the the content, 
implementation and legitimacy of policy. So despite the emphasis in enlargement on hierarchy, 
networks develop as a result of the dynamics of environmental policy and because of a preference 
on how governance should be conducted. It is not a question of either hierarchy or networks but the 
balance between them, so what is the relationship between hierarchy and networks in states with 
weak civil society and a legacy of centralised government? 
The paper considers, first, the reasons for selecting Croatia and Macedonia (both were seeking EU 
membership but were at different stages) and examines the utility of Social Network Analysis (SNA) 
in exploring the scope and intensity of actor interaction in a specific policy area. SNA is also valuable 
because it offers a methodology for exploring the separate but interconnected processes of 
institutional creation and evolution, and the creation of environmental governance. The subsequent 
two sections examine this process in the two case countries. Whilst both Croatia and Macedonia are 
responding to the same external pressures  W ƚŚĞƚƌĂŶƐƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶĂŶĚŝŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞh ?Ɛ
environmental directives  W national contexts vary. Particularly relevant here is the tension between 
the demands of enlargement and creating environmental governance, which inevitably elevates the 
centre, and especially the environment ministry, and the political, legal and technical complexities of 
environmental policy that stresses the involvement and engagement of civil society, in societies with 
strong centralist traditions and weak civil societies. This paper shows how transposing EU 
environmental policy leads to the creation of policy networks (whose complexity increases over time 
as policy evolves) by the exercise of state power. The EU lays down the specifics of policy (the acquis 
communautiare) and transposition requires a state with the capabilities and capacities to achieve 
policy objectives using specialist networks of actors influenced by national conditions. The paper 
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explores how two candidate countries responded to the same process, which produce both 
hierarchy and network and shows that there is no contradiction between hierarchy and network. 
Case Selection and Methodology 
Conceptually the paper is located in the broad field of Europeanization (ĚĞĨŝŶĞĚĂƐ ‘ƚŚĞĚŽŵĞƐƚŝĐ
adaptatŝŽŶƚŽƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?Vink and Graziano 2007: 7) with enlargement as the vehicle for 
Europeanization (For example, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005; Vachudova 2005; Grabbe 
2006; and Schimmelfennig 2008), and environmental governance in Croatia and Macedonia is seen 
as the result of these processes. The paper employs a top-down perspective, which emphasises the 
necessity for downwards pressure for Europeanization to take place, which is manifested in the 
ĞŶůĂƌŐĞŵĞŶƚƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ?,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ? ‘ŵŝƐĨŝƚ ?(Börzel 2002) by itself cannot explain Europeanisation 
ĞŶƚŝƌĞůǇ ?ŚĞŶĐĞƚŚĞƉĂƉĞƌ ?ƐĨŽĐƵƐŽŶĚŽŵĞƐƚŝĐĂĐƚŽƌƐĂŶĚƚŚĞŝƌƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƚŽƚŚĞh ?Ɛpressure for 
adaptation. The acquis raise specific, sectorally focussed problems of adaptation that have 
functional, political and administrative dimensions in which the national state plays a critical role in 
addressing misfit and closing the gap beteen the EU and the domestic, and bridging the gap between 
formal compliance and full implementation. As capacities and capabilities are likely to be strongest 
at the centre, the centre will inevitably play an important role in extending these capacities and 
capabilities sub-nationally and into civil society (See, for example, Mungiu-Pippidi 2010; Cohen and 
Lampe 2011; Trauner 2011; Noutcheva 2012; Bieber 2013; and Elbasani 2013). Given the scale of the 
misfit between the EU and domestic environmental policy, the complexity of environmental policy, 
and the absence of appropriate capacities we would expect the centre to play a leading role creating 
environmental policy networks. Engagement with the EU via enlargement not only promotes 
Europeanisation but it has a tendency to reinforce the centre; in polities with a history of centralised 
governance, where the Commission is seeking to create capable states, we would expect to see a 
concentration of power at the centre of the environmental policy network. 
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Croatia was selected because at the time of the research it was approaching the final stages of the 
accession process (it acceded to the EU in July 2013) and had demonstrated an ability to achieve an 
acceptable level of transposition and compliance. Macedonia, part of the same process, remained a 
considerable distance from achieving an acceptable level of transposition and compliance, partly 
because it was a less capable state than Croatia. As former republics of Yugoslavia both enjoyed a 
historical legacy of state centralisation and underdeveloped civil societies, although Croatia was seen 
as more developed in  both respects. Both were under great downwards pressure to adapt and 
create the capacities and capabilities needed to satisfy the requirements of membership. However, 
these states were subject to another pressure. The EU aspires to open up policy making to civil 
society and Member States are expected to promote openness, participation, accountability, 
effectivenes and coherence in governance, which are more likely to be achieved through networks 
(CEC 2001a, 18). So the key questions in relation to environmental governance are, first,  what is the 
ĐĞŶƚƌĞ ?ƐƌŽůĞŝŶƌĞƐƉŽŶĚŝŶŐƚŽĚŽǁŶǁĂƌĚƉƌĞƐƐƵƌĞĨƌŽŵƚŚĞh ?ĂŶĚƐĞĐŽŶĚ ?ǁŚĂƚŝƐƚŚĞƌĞƐƵůƚŝŶŐ
balance between hierearchy and network? 
To examine institutional creation and development the project employed Social Network Analysis 
(SNA). A social network is a set of organisations connected by relationships designed (or intended) to 
achieve policy objectives through the exchange of resources (Taylor, Geddes and Lees 2012: 26-29). 
Network is frequently used as a metaphor for complexity but SNA shifts the focus from the 
organisations involved to the nature of the links between organisations, so rather than treat 
organisations as the unit of analysis SNA concentrates on how the structure of ties affects outcomes, 
ŵŽǀŝŶŐĂǁĂǇĨƌŽŵĂ ‘ďůĂĐŬ-ďŽǆ ?ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŽƚŚĞƉŽůŝĐǇƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ (For example, Dowding 1995). SNA is 
used to visualise and map networks and estimate how and with what intensity participants interact; 
the data used in this paper is from twenty in-depth semi-structured interviews with, for example, 
civil servants and civil-society actors, supplemented by interviews with Commission officials in 
Brussels. Interviewees in Croatia and Macedonia also completed detailed questionnaires identifying 
the organisations with which they interacted, the nature of these interactions, and their intensity. 
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Interviewees were also also asked to explain how in their view the intensity and scope of interaction 
had changed over the previous decade, the source(s) of that change, and who were the most 
influential participants and whether these had changed over time.  
Using UCINET/Netdraw (http://analytitech/ucinet) the questionnaire responses were  coded to 
generate network maps (Figures 1 and 2) in order to estimate the scope and intensity of interaction. 
^EŚĞůƉƵƐƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶƚĞƌĂĐƚŝŽŶĨƌŽŵƚŚĞĂĐƚŽƌƐ ?ƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞĂŶĚindicates which actors are 
perceived to play a critical role in determining outcomes (Wasserman and Faust 1994; Breiger 2004; 
Brandes and Erlebach 2005; Carrington et al. 2005). When using SNA to map a network we must be 
careful not to assume too much from its physical shape. It is easy to assume that a large, complex 
map with many participants indicates a diffuse power structure and pluralistic politics; equally 
smaller, tighter networks do not necessarily indicate an oligarchical, power structure because the 
ties between the actors could be weak and sporadic. Central to the interview schedule was the 
assessment of reputation; asking interviewees who they considered to be the most influential and 
with whom their organisation interacted most frequently (Polsby 1980: 144-5). Coupling interview 
data and SNA facilitates the analysis of power and influence flowing from network relationships and 
how the network responds to pressure for change from inside and outside the network. The 
resulting networks maps were triangulated against other sources, notably the interviews with 
participants and through extensive analysis of primary documents and secondary material. No 
attempt was made at achieving complete coverage because of time and resource constraints but 
ĂůƐŽďĞĐĂƵƐĞŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ƌĞƉƵƚĂƚŝŽŶĂů ?ŵĞƚŚŽĚ(asking interviewees who they considered to be 
influential) used in the interviews. Interviewees were not specifically asked about European 
integration to avoid over-emphasising the EU as a driver of change and crowding out other relevant 
actors. Where no other interviewee subsequently mentioned an actor, that actor was excluded, to 
avoid long lists of participants. We sought to distinguish how actors perceived the influence (or lack 
of influence) of the EU on their activities and so the queƐŝŽŶŶĂŝƌĞĚŝƐƚŝŶŐƵŝƐŚĞĚďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ‘ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ ?
interaction and day-to-day interaction at the level of projects. This produced a very interesting 
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result. The EU may not be a visible participant in a ŶĞƚǁŽƌŬ ?ƐƌŽutine operation but actors 
nonetheless perceive it to be an influential, even a determining influence, on the network and this 
starts with the creation of the network.  
Emerging environmental governance in Croatia 
dŚĞŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶŝŶŝƚŝĂůůǇĂƐƐĞƐƐĞĚƌŽĂƚŝĂ ?ƐĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚĂůƉƌŽǀŝƐŝŽŶƐĂƐ ‘ƚŽƚĂůůǇŝŶĐŽŵƉĂƚŝďůĞ ?ǁŝƚŚ
ƚŚĞh ?Ɛ ?ƚŚĞŽŶůǇĐŚĂƉƚĞƌƐŽĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚ ?&ƵůůĐŽŵƉůŝĂnĐĞƌĞƋƵŝƌĞĚ ‘ĂƐƵƐƚĂŝŶĞĚŚŝŐŚůĞǀĞůŽĨ
ŝŶǀĞƐƚŵĞŶƚĂŶĚĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂďůĞĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝǀĞĞĨĨŽƌƚ ?ƚŚĂƚ ?ĐŽƵůĚŽŶůǇďĞĂĐŚŝĞǀĞĚŝŶƚŚĞůŽŶŐƚĞƌŵ ?
(CEC 2005a, 103-04). Compliance clearly required heavy investment in hierarchy but only once 
during accession did an annual Progress Report record full transposition of an environmental  acqui 
(noise in 2001). 
The Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) between Croatia and the EU was signed in 
October 2001, ratified by EU member states in 2004, and Croatia was granted full candidate status in 
June 2004,  joining the EU in July 2013. In this process environmental issues assumed considerable 
practical and symbolic importance as the environmental acquis were complex and were major 
ŝŶĚŝĐĂƚŽƌŽĨĂĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?ƐǁŝůůŝŶŐŶĞƐƐĂŶĚĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽĨƵůůĨŝůƚŚĞh ?ƐƌĞƋƵŝƌĞŵĞŶƚƐ ?sůĂƓŝđĂŶĚ&ĞŬĞƚŝĂ
2006). The Commission Opinion on Croatia noted serious weaknesses in environmental governance, 
including the development of horizontal legislation, undertaking environment impact assessments, 
and public participation. The Commission emphasised the need for strengthened administrative 
capacity at the national and regional levels to ensure effective policy making and implementation, 
including the preparation of financial strategies, the strengthening of regional and national 
inspectorates to enforce environmental legislation, and adopting and implementing a 
comprehensive national waste management plan (CEC 2001b). The Accession Partnership 
Agreement (OJ 2006: 37), which sought the mainstreaming of environmental policy by integrating 
environmental protection requirements into other sectoral policies, represented a fundamental 
transformation of policy. The Agreement also identified the need to develop an environmental 
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investment strategy, speeding up the transposition of the environmental acquis (especially in the 
fields of waste management, air quality, water quality, nature protection, and integrated pollution 
prevention and control), investing in environment infrastructure, and ratifying the Kyoto protocol. 
This represented a significant and complex governance project for Croatia. 
Substantial change resulted from this downwards pressure. Croatia established a National 
Environmental Information System (NEIS) as part of the acquis compliance process and the data 
gathered indicated the need for widespread improvements in environmental performance. The 
immediate priorities were resolving waste management problems and the continued harmonization 
of domestic legislation with the acquis. At the time of our field-work, this progress was recognised 
ďǇĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚĂůŝƐƚƐ P ‘ƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚƉƌŽŐƌĞƐƐŝƐĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞĚŝŶƚŚĞĚƌĂĨƚŝŶŐĂŶĚĂĚŽƉtion of legislation, 
and in the development of national environmental institutions. Also, most of the relevant 
international agreements have been ratified and there are clear indicators of the integration of 
environmental and sustainable development objectŝǀĞƐŝŶŽƚŚĞƌƐĞĐƚŽƌƐ ? ?Interview. Heinrich Böll 
Foundation, 19 December 2007). This indicated the creation of environmental governance response 
to EU pressure but what institutions underpinned this governance and how did these institutions 
interact? 
The key institutional actor was the Ministry of Environmental Protection, Physical Planning and 
Construction established in 2004 by merging of the State Directorate for the Protection of Nature 
and the Environment and elements of the Ministry of Physical Planning, Construction and Housing, 
which had been concerned primarily with physical planning and construction rather than 
environmental protection. This reorganisation was in direct response to the requirements of EU 
policy. The largest and most important directorate was and remains the Directorate for 
Environmental Management. Beyond the environment ministry, the Ministry of Culture had 
responsibility for Nature Protection, through its Nature Protection Directorate and the State 
Institute for Nature Protection (2002), whilst responsibility for Water Management lay with the 
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Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Water Management, the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare 
and the Ministry of Economy, Labour and Entrepreneurship as well as Croatian Waters (Hrvatske 
Vode), a government agency responsible for the water resource management. Coastal waters were 
the responsibility of the Ministry of Sea, Transport and Infrastructure. Drafting legislation was mainly 
undertaken by the Committee on Physical Planning and Environmental Protection in the Croatian 
Parliament, which defined strategic priorities for environmental protection and was therefore a key 
target for lobbying by societal interests. Co-ordination and interest aggregation issues, especially 
between economic and environmental actors, was taken to the Sustainable Development and 
Environmental Protection Council. Two arms-length institutions operated at the national level: the 
Croatian Environmental Agency (CEA) and the Environmental Protection and Energy Efficiency Fund 
(Environmental Fund). These were modelled on the US or German template and were established by 
the National Environmental Action Plan (2002) and reflected moves towards institutional 
strengthening. The CEA was a direct result of the signing of the SAA, in which Article 81 of the 
Implementation Plan for the SAA envisaged establishing the Agency by the end of 2002, and Article 
103 had stipulated the creation of an Environment Information System (CEC 2001b). The 
Environmental Fund was established in 2004 by the Ministry of Environment and the Ministry of 
Economics in consultation with the Energy Institute, to support projects and activities in 
environment protection, energy efficiency and renewable energy. It was intended to be the main 
conduit for the administration of the IPA funds in the field of environmental protection. External 
help was crucial and the government, supported by various donors, undertook training and capacity 
building at all levels, but especially sub-nationally, to meet EU requirements (DEC 2004).   
EU project funds invariably involved working with organisations from EU member states, For 
instance EU aid, via a Netherlands consultancy, provided help to transpose the 2001 Environmental 
Assessment of Development Strategies (SEAS) directive that required regional and local 
governments undetake assessments involving stakeholders, civil society, and the public as well 
creating institutions and administrative capacities (DEC 2003). These projects were important for 
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both capacity building and social learning. The 20 regional counties (plus Zagreb city) and 429 local 
municipalities played a role in the governance of environmental policy. At the time of fieldwork 
Croatia had adopted 30 LEAPs and in addition to LEAPs, the government cooperated with different 
donor organizations to deliver training and build capacity at the sub-national level in order to meet 
EU standards and requirements and ensure that local municipalities would be able to comply with 
EU policies. The EU was therefore critical in creating institutions; we must now consider how these 
institutions interact. 
Figure 1 reveals a visually complex, indeed fragmented, network but one that remained strongly 
hierarchical in its operations in both the  ‘ǀĞƌƚŝĐĂů ? ?ĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?ďĞƚǁeen the environment ministry 
and sub-national governments ? ?ĂŶĚ ‘ŚŽƌŝǌŽŶƚĂů ? ?ďĞƚǁĞĞŶŵŝŶŝƐƚƌŝĞƐŽƌƐŽĐŝĞƚĂůŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ ?ĨŽƌ
example, between the Croatian Business Council for Sustainable Development and the Croatian 
Employers Association). The network spanned all spheres of governance, with links to the 
international or regional level (through, for example, the UNDP, the World Bank, or REC) linking to 
the sub-national administrative levels, as well as the environmental NGOs. The core network was 
defined by a small number of strategic linkages, based on resource dependency or common socio-
economic interests but beyond the core was an outer group of participants with little sustained 
purchase on the core network, which was dominated by the environment ministry and whose 
dominance was reinforced by low levels of interaction outside the core.  
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Figure 1  The environment network: Croatia  
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Key to figure 1 
Organisation SNA abbreviation 
Ministry of Environment MEnv 
Ministry of Economy MEc 
Ministry of Culture MCult 
State Nature Protection Institute SNPI 
Fund for Environment Protection and Energy Efficiency FEP 
Croatian Environment Agency CEA 
Central State Office for Strategy CSOS 
Croatian Bank for Reconstruction and Development CBRD 
European Commission Delegation Croatia DelCEC 
Regional and local governments RLGovs 
Croatian Business Council for Sustainable Development CBCSD 
Faculties Unis 
World Bank World Bank 
Regional Environment Centre REC 
UNDP UNDP 
national NGOs natNGOs 
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international NGOs intNGOs 
Ministry of Forestry MFor 
Ministry of Water Management MWM 
ƌŽĂƚŝĂŶŵƉůŽǇĞƌƐ ?ƐƐŽĐŝĂƚŝŽŶ CEmplA 
Croatian Chamber of Economy CCE 
European Environmental Advisory Councils EEAC 
European Environmental Bureau EEB 
United Nations industrial development organisation UNIDO 
United Nations Environmental Programme UNEP 
Mediterranean Information Office for Environment, Culture  
and Sustainable Development 
MIO-ECSDE 
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 ? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Occasional business relations/ work contacts 
Regular contacts, often in relation to specfic projects 
Permanent and strategic relationship 
Central ministries 
EU actors 
Para-government 
agencies 
Non-governmental 
organisations 
International 
organisations 
Member State agencies 
Non-member state 
agencies 
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There were important links between the UNDP and both regional and local tiers of government 
(RGovs and LGovs), as well as between the European Commission Delegation to Croatia (DelCEC) and 
the environment ministry (MEnv). The environment ministry (not surprisingly) had strong ties with 
the Croatian Environmental Agency (CEA), which in turn had strong links to the universities (Unis) 
and to the State Nature Protection Institute (SNPI). The environment ministry was linked to the 
Ministry of Economy, Labour and Entrepreneurship (MEc) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
European Integration (MFor). There was also a strong connection between the Croatian Business 
Council for Sustainable Development (CBCSD) and the Croatian Employers Association (CEmpA). 
The key actor, the environment ministry, acted as the gatekeeper to EU engagement and was 
located at the centre of the network. This indicates that the transformation of environment 
governance as a result of engagement with the EU was a work in progress, the network was still 
being constructed and developing its ways of working. Institutional creation had not led to a 
significant re-distribution of power and resources because of the focus on creating effective central 
capacity as part of accession and because of weaknesses in capacity sub-nationally and amongst civil 
society. As one civil society interviewee stressed P ‘ƚŚĞDŝŶŝƐƚƌǇĨŽƌĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚĂůƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŽŶŝƐ
absolutely the biggest authorŝƚǇ ? ? ? ? ?ĂŶĚŝƚŝƐǀĞƌǇĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚƚŽƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƚŚĞŝƌĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐĂŶĚƐƵƌǀŝǀĞ ?
(Interview. Croatian Business Council for Sustainable Development, 19 December 2007).  
Interview evidence showed the EU was recognised as highly influential in creating institutions, 
priorities, and policy. It was clear from interviews and other evidence that the priority given by 
Croatian national authorities to the EU accession process did have consequences for the content and 
quality of the policies adopted but also stimulated the inclusion of a diverse set of actors operating 
in a network. However, the demands of enlargement conditioned the distribution of power within 
and the operation of this network. Interviewees claimed that the designation of a particular policy 
initiative as being of  ‘ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ ?ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞ had ƚŚĞĞĨĨĞĐƚŽĨ ‘shutting out ?ŶŽŶ-state actors in a 
 ‘ĨĂƐƚ-ƚƌĂĐŬ ?ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ intended to secure transposition with minimum delay in which societal actors 
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were precieved as potential obstacles, although espondents in the Commission were sceptical about 
this claim. Comission interviewees insisted they had seen no evidence of this and, in any case, the 
Commission accepted the inevitability of a limited role for non-governmental actors at this stage of 
the process. What mattered was the direction of travel (Interviews: DG Enlargement, 31 March 2009 
and DG Environment, 25 May 2009). The danger was, as an interviewee expressed ŝƚ P ‘ƚŚĞƉĂĐĞŽĨ
change is too fast because of the accession to the EU  W ƐŽƚŚĞǇĐĂŶ ?ƚĐŽƉĞǁŝƚŚŝƚƉƌŽƉĞƌůy, or there is 
not ĞŶŽƵŐŚĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇƚŽĐŽƉĞǁŝƚŚŝƚŝŶǁĂǇƐƚŚĂƚǁĞƐŚŽƵůĚ ? ?/ŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁ ?hEW ?8 February 2008); a 
second ďůĂŵĞĚ ‘ƚŚĞƐƚĂŵƉĞĚĞŽĨƵƌŽƉĞĂŶůĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĨŽƌŝŶƐƚĂŶĐĞĞĂĐŚůĂǁƚŚĂƚŚĂƐƚŚŝƐ ‘h
ƐƚĂŵƉ ?ŐŽĞƐŝŶƚŽĨĂƐƚƉƌŽĐĞĚƵƌĞ ?ŶŽƚĂŶŽƌŵĂůƌĞĂĚŝŶŐ ? ?/ŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁ ?'ƌĞĞŶĐƚŝŽŶE'K ? ? ?DĂǇ ? ? ? ? ? ?
The Commission sensed that societal participation was not a priority and it did comment adversely 
on the amount and quality of public and NGO participation, a legal right neutralised by weak or non-
existent mechanisms, whilst conceding the pre-eminence of hierarchy (CEC 2004, 103-04). To 
counter the centralisation stimulated by EU accession, respondents from interests that perceived 
themselves as being excluded (primarily civil society bodies) from effective participation in the policy 
process constructed a rival narrative to justify their future inclusion, arguing that centralisation (and 
therefore exclusion) would pose an obstacle to accession and produce poor policy and would have 
to be reversed eventually (Interview. Croatian Environmental Agency, 15 May 2008). 
Thus, we have a state-centric governance: a centralised but fragmented horizontal dimension with 
environmental issues spread across of five ministries (albeit with one clearly pre-eminent ministry), 
exercising competencies over distinct policy segments, often with a lack of coordination between 
the actors. There are similar issues in the relationships between ministries and their clients in the 
vertical dimension. Despite some formal devolution of powers, municipalities, for example, were 
perceived to lack both a culture of inclusion and consultation, as well as adequate resources, 
administrative capacity, and technical expertise (CEC 2009a, 61-62). Where capacity and know-how 
was absent, the obvious sources of expertise were the NGOs. NGO representatives saw their 
inclusion in networks as formal and symbolic, although some NGOs, such as Green Action, Zagreb 
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and the Green Forum (a network of around 40 environmental NGO) did believe they had a 
substantive (albeit limited) input into environmental governance (Interview. Green Action NGO, 14 
May 2008). 
Emerging environmental governance in Macedonia 
Engagement with the EU dates from the National Environment Action Plan (1997, revised 2004) that 
set out the strategy for compliance with the acquis (MEPP 1997, 2004). The Commission ?Ɛ 
assessment in the early-2000s ǁĂƐƚŚĂƚDĂĐĞĚŽŶŝĂŚĂĚŵĂĚĞ ‘ƌĞĂƐŽŶĂďůĞ ?ƉƌŽŐƌĞƐƐŝŶŚŽƌŝǌŽŶƚĂů
legislation, air quality, and waste management, but had had less success in water quality, nature 
protection, industrial pollution and risk management, noise, and GMOs. dŚĞŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ ?ƐĂŶĂůǇƚŝĐĂů
ƌĞƉŽƌƚŽŶŚĂƉƚĞƌ ? ?ŶŽƚĞĚDĂĐĞĚŽŶŝĂ ?ƐůĞŐĂůĨƌĂŵĞǁŽƌŬ ?ƚŚĞ>ĂǁŽŶŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚ ? ? ? ? ? ?identified 
implementation as the main problem and  ‘&ƵůůĐŽŵƉůŝĂŶĐĞ ?ĐŽƵůĚďĞĂĐŚŝĞǀĞĚŽŶůǇŝŶƚŚĞůŽŶŐ
term, and would necessitate increased ůĞǀĞůƐŽĨŝŶǀĞƐƚŵĞŶƚ ? ? ? ? ? ?, 7).  
Acquis transposition and implementation was covered by the second National Programme for the 
Approximation of the Acquis (NPAAII) with the environment acquis covered by the National Strategy 
for Environmental Acquis. This complex strategy embraced 19 specific Directive implementation 
plans covering 73 separate pieces of EU legislation, which lead to the reorganisation of the 
environment ministry to enable it to lead on environment policy. However, within this process 
transposition took primacy, with implementation and enforcement to be ƌĞĂůŝƐĞĚŽǀĞƌĂ ‘ƌĞĂƐŽŶĂďůĞ ?
(defined as 10 year) period. Horizontal legislation was to be fully approximated by 2012; GMO, 
Chemicals, and Noise by 2015, with the most costly and complex (such as Nature Protection, 
Integrate Pollution Control, Waste Management, Water, and Air Quality) between 2018-2022. Legal 
transposition would be completed between 2008 and 2012 and full implementation (including 
ĞŶĨŽƌĐĞŵĞŶƚ ?ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ? ? ? ?ĂŶĚ ? ? ? ?ĂƚĂĐŽƐƚŽĨ ? ? ? ?ďŶ ĂďŽƵƚ ? ? ? ?ŵƉ ?Ă ? ?(MEPP 2008, 13).  
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Inevitably, then, the key institutional actor in Macedonia, the Ministry of Urban Planning, 
Construction and Environment, which was reorganized into four departments: Legislation and 
Standardization, Sustainable Development, European Integration, and Environmental Information. 
Two field-based divisions cover the Lake Ohrid conservation and the Lake Doiran salvage projects. 
The ministry administers the State Environment Inspectorate, the Office of the Environment, and the 
Fund for the Environment and Nature Protection and Improvement. There was limited involvement 
by the ministries of Agriculture, Transport and Telecommunications, Health, and Forestry. In 
addition, there is input from administrators responsible for the Environment Chapter within the 
Secretariat for European Affairs, as well as the Agency for Development and Investments, and the 
Parliamentary Commission on Environment, Youth and Sports. There is no stand-alone Environment 
Agency.The environment ministry (aided by relevant ministries, the SEA and other bodies) is 
responsible for drafting legislation and policy and strategy documents in line with EU requirements 
(Taylor, Geddes and Lees 2012, 198).The ministry had limited staff and resources (as did the State 
Environmental Inspectorate) and the resources allocated to inspections, implementation, 
compliance and enforcement were inadequate for the scale of the problems confronting 
DĂĐĞĚŽŶŝĂ ?ƐĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚ. Central to environmental governance were Local Environmental Action 
Plans (LEAPS) ?ĞǀĞŶƚŚŽƵŐŚƚŚĞŵƵŶŝĐŝƉĂůŝƚŝĞƐ ?ĐĂƉĂĐŝƚŝĞƐǁĞƌĞůŝŵŝƚĞĚ ?The environment ministry 
fully recognized the need for co-operation with sub-national government and between the 
municipalities (Interview. Ministry of the Environment, 8 March 2008). The key obstacle to 
empowering the sub-state level was a lack of administrative capacity and expertise, not least the 
lack of staff capable of accessing international networks and know-how. Several serious weaknesses 
in environmental governance and implementation stem from this lack but the structure of municipal 
government was relativedly new at the time of original research and was politically contentious. The 
ŵƵŶŝĐŝƉĂůŝƚŝĞƐ ?ŶĞǁŶĞƐƐinevitably meant they were weak in terms of the capacities and capabilities 
required in a highly technical area like environment policy.  
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Equally limited was the role of NGOs and civil society organisations, although some (such as the 
Association of Environmentalists and the Institute for Sustainable Communities) were recognised by 
a range interviewees as influential. The problem was aƐŽŶĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƉƵƚŝƚ P ‘ǁĞĚƌĂĨƚƚŚĞ
laws, but the weak link here is the implementation, so the most negative influence in this area 
comes from the people, the individuals because of the low consciousness level about the 
environment ... also an important factor are the low sanctions, low punishment payments that are 
ƐĞƚďǇƚŚĞůĂǁƐ ? ?/ŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁ ?DŝŶŝƐƚƌǇŽĨthe Environment, 8 March 2008). The involvement of civil 
society actors in Macedonia though weak was growing (albeit from a low base) and participation was 
recognized as a legitimate and necessary objective of policy. Respondents identified NGOs such as 
the Association of Environmentalists, or the Institute for Sustainable Communities as being 
reasonably influential, not necessarilly in strategic terms but through involvement in specific 
projects, although there was a perception that NGOs were less active than previously, when basic 
strategies were being developed. Expertise was still offered but this was more on a task-specific 
basis than one of extended partnership. 
Figure 2 outlines an extremely sparse network composed of few actors and a limited degree of 
interaction with a small number closely interconnected central actors.   
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Figure 2 The environment network: Macedonia  
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Organisation SNA abbreviation 
Regional Environmental Center for Central and Eastern Europe REC 
Movement of Ecologists of Macedonia MEM 
Macedonian Ecological Society MES 
Macedonian Green Centre MGC 
NGOs NGOs 
Municipalities LGovs 
Frankfurt Zoological Society FZS 
Euronatur Euronatur 
Plantlife International PI 
Birdlife International BI 
Ministry of Environment and Physical Planning MEnv 
Black Vulture Conservation Foundation BVCF 
Gesellschaft für technische Zusammenarbeit GTZ 
UNDP UNDP 
Planetum Planetum 
Institute of Sustainable Communities ISC 
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 An embryonic environmental policy network developed in response to engagement with the EU, 
with a core dominated by the environment ministry reflecting the overall need to establish effective 
hiearchies capable of implementing EU policy. The network outlined in Figure 2 is clearly a work in 
ƉƌŽŐƌĞƐƐƐŽƚŚĞŶĞƚǁŽƌŬ ?Ɛ ‘ĞŵƉƚŝŶĞƐƐ ?ŝŶĚŝĐĂƚĞƐĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂďůĞƐĐŽƉĞĨŽƌ ‘ĨŝůůŝŶŐ-ŝŶ ? ?dĂǇůŽƌ ?'ĞĚĚĞƐ
ĂŶĚ>ĞĞƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?dŚĞŶĞƚǁŽƌŬ ?ƐĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶĂƌǇƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂů ?ĂƐǁĞůůĂƐƚŚĞĚŽŵŝŶĂŶĐĞŽĨŚŝĞƌĂƌĐŚǇ ?ŝƐ
evident from this observation by an  environment ministry official who noted that passing laws was 
not the problem but implementation was. This refered not only to the weakness of the network but 
its limited inability to enforce (and monitor) decisions because of a lack of sub-national enforcement 
capacity (Interview, 8 March 2008). Interviewees indentified the REC (an external actor) as enjoying 
most influence at the national level.  This external influence is subject to a gatekeeper in the shape 
of MEPP (MEnv), which enjoys very close linkages with REC, local government, and with the 
Movement of Ecologists of Macedonia (MEM). There is considerable involvement by external actors 
but only the REC is a participant in the core network; there are other examples of permanent-
strategic relationships (for example, Plantlife International with the Macedonian Ecological Society) 
but these are isolated. The involvement of external groups are either occasional (such as UNDP and 
GTZ) or regular contacts (such as FZS and Euronatur) based on specific projects. What we see are 
several strategic relationships (involving, for example, the environment ministry, the Regional 
Environmental Centre, ecologists, local government; and between the Macedonian Ecological 
Society and other environmental groups such as Plant Life International and the BVCF). These 
components ĂƌĞŶŽƚ ‘ũŽŝŶĞĚƵƉ ?ĂŶĚƚŚŝƐĐŽŶǀĞǇƐƚŚĞŝŵƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶŽĨ ĂŶĞŵĞƌŐŝŶŐŶĞƚǁŽƌŬďĂƐĞĚŽŶ
engagement derived from specific projects, not permanent partnership workings. This is a 
fragmented network reflecting the historic weakness of environment as a policy sector in 
Macedonian politics and the small number of central actors involved. This is what we would expect 
ƚŽƐĞĞŝŶƚŚĞĞĂƌůǇƐƚĂŐĞƐŽĨĂƉŽůŝĐǇƐĞĐƚŽƌ ?ƐĂŶĚŝƚƐŶĞƚǁŽƌŬ ?ƐĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ? In contrast to Croatia 
notable is the absence of the EU delegation. 
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These weaknesses in capacity and capability had significant effects on delivery and coordination, 
with resources concentrating at the centre, ǁŚŝĐŚŵĞĂŶƚƚŚĂƚDĂĐĞĚŽŶŝĂ ‘ŝƐŶŽƚǇĞƚƐƵĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚůǇ
prepared in the field ŽĨĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐŝĐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?, 69). Technical and infrastructural weaknesses 
and the low visibility of civil society, reinforced, by the over-riding objective of accession, inevitably 
meant a focus on the creation of central hierarchical capacity rather than network governance. Plans 
to strengthen national and sub-national capacity between 2009 and 2014 were undermined by 
shortages of resources and weak coordination (CEC 2009b, 69-70). This meant that even when 
complex EU-derived strategies were developed and laws passed, the administrative structures 
ŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇĨŽƌŝŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶǁĞƌĞǁĞĂŬŽƌĞǀĞŶĂďƐĞŶƚ ?dŚĞŶĞƚǁŽƌŬǁĂƐ ?ƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ? ‘ŚŽůůŽǁ ?ĞǀĞŶ
though Macedonia had aligned itself with EU legislation. Waste management, one of the most 
complex of EU environmental policies, illustrates the problem: despite passing the necessary 
ůĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝŽŶ ‘ĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝǀĞĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇŝƐƐƚŝůůŝŶƐƵĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚĂƚďŽƚh central and local level. Investment in 
this area is far from sufficient ... A system of data collection, registration and reporting is still not 
ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů ? ? ? ? ? ?, 71). Interviewees recognised these problems and that they had to be 
overcome if environmental governance was to be effective, a sentiment that was particularly strong 
in the Secretariat for European Affairs, which was responsible for coordinating enlargement activity. 
Interestingly, the SEA was not indentified as a network participant in its own right, its involvement 
came via the environment ministry. As an SEA interviewee expressed thus it: hierarchy took priority 
 ‘ďĞĐĂƵƐĞǁĞǁĂŶƚƚŽďĞĐŽŵĞĂŶĚhŵĞŵďĞƌ ? ?Interview, 7 March 2008). This focus on hierarchy 
did not prevent the growth of a network but shortages of resources and capabilitites, and the 
considerable load inherent in environment policy inevitably placed a premium on strengthening 
capacity and hierarchy (Interview. Institute for Sustainable Communities, 6 March 2008).  
Some NGOs even sensed a decline in their influence, believing they were actively courted when 
legislation and strategy were being developed and then ignored when the focus shifted to 
implementation where hierarchy predominated. This was because of the emphasis on creating 
central capacity as part of enlargement (Taylor, Geddes and Lees 2012, 201). Figure 2 shows that 
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institutions have been created by EU demands and the EU has stimulated learning and the extension 
of policy downwards through sub-national governments and into civil society. Interestingly, actors 
were conscious of the normative dimensions of environmental governance and the EU ?ƐƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ
for partnership working in networks, and believed that non-governmental actors would eventually 
play a major role in environmental governance (Interview. Institute for Sustainable Development, 8 
March 2008). Consultation developed rapidly under EU influence but partnership working remained 
underdeveloped because the fundamental pressure was to create effective hierarchy as part of the 
enlargement process and because civil society organisations often lack the capacity to fullfil their 
expected role. 
In so far as there have been changes in the structures of environmental governance in Macedonia 
our interviewees stressed that EU-funded projects were aimed at capacity building and social 
learning and these projects were  key sources of change. Despite, or perhaps because of, the 
weaknesses of environmental governance, the influence of external organisations was surprisingly 
strong on both government and civil society. As a one official argued ‘regarding different projects we 
cooperate and communicate with EU members, for example Italy, Austria, or Switzerland, which it is 
not in the EU but it supports a lot of projects in Republic of Macedonia in the field of bilateral 
cooperation ..... . The stability pact is also present [and] we have cooperated with them [sic]. Then 
there are the neighbouring countries and regional ones, like Greece .... then bilateral cooperation 
with Albania, Bulgaria, Turkey and others. I am mentioning these countries regarding the financial 
assistance that has been provided, and all the projects implemented (Interview. Secretariat for 
European Affairs, 7 March 2008).  
This was echoed by an NGO activist:  ‘we cooperate with many such organizations from Spain, 
Germany, Switzerland, Bulgaria, and Greece. Mainly from the nongovernmental sector - professional 
E'KƐ ?tĞĐŽŽƉĞƌĂƚĞůĞƐƐǁŝƚŚĚŽŵĞƐƚŝĐŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?/ŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁ ?DĂĐĞĚŽŶŝĂŶĐŽůŽŐŝĐĂů^ŽĐŝĞƚǇ ? ?
March 2008). 
 25 
 
During  fieldwork we found limited evidence of the mainstreaming of environmental policy with 
competences largely confined to the environment ministry, with limited input from other ministries 
and the SEA, and the Parliamentary Commission on Environment, Youth and Sports. There are 
limited network effects on the vertical (central  W subnational) dimension and NGO involvement is 
limited; their expertise is sought on a task-specific basis rather than through partnership. The key 
point, however, is that interviewees from central government and those closely involved with 
enlargement, indicated a willingness, indeed a determination, to open up environmental governance 
to partnership working on lines envisaged by the EU (Interview. Secretariat for European Affairs, 7 
March 2008). As institutions were created, however, the key problem was creating and enhancing 
administrative capacity and expertise at the centre and then at the sub-state level in order to first 
transpose and then implement the environmental acquis. This implied a potential shift of power 
away from the centre, something which central actors were reluctant to sanction because they 
feared the introduction of potential irritants into the enlargement process. In the context of new 
institutions and limited resources this was a substantial load. ƐŽŶĞƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶƚƉƵƚŝƚ P ‘ĂůůĚŝƌĞĐƚŝŽŶƐ
are coming through the EU... from the DG, so we are trying to follow everything that is going on in 
the EU, as fast as we can to adopt it, to implement it properly.... it is crucial because we want to 
ďĞĐŽŵĞĂŶhŵĞŵďĞƌ ? ?/ŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁ ?^ĞĐƌĞƚĂƌŝĂƚĨŽƌƵƌŽƉĞĂŶĨĨĂŝƌƐ ? ?DĂƌĐŚ ? ? ? ? ? ? The primary 
objective was, therefore, to increase (primarily) central state capacity. As one interviewee 
ŵĞŵŽƌĂďůǇƉƵƚŝƚ P ‘/ƚŚŝŶŬŽƚŚĞƌĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐŝŶƚŚĞƌĞŐŝŽŶĂŶĚĞƐƉĞĐŝĂůůǇƚŚŽƐĞǁŚŽĂƌĞĂŚĞĂĚŽĨƚŚĞŵ
in the track to the EU: Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia, Czech Republic and Slovakia. They look at those 
countries as places for learning [but] the EU is not seen as a place of learning but as a place of 
ƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚƐ ? ?/ŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁ ?/ŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞĨŽƌ^ƵƐƚĂŝŶĂďůĞŽŵŵƵŶŝƚŝĞƐ ? ?DĂƌĐŚ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
Conclusions 
The evidence presented here shows that establishing new modes of environmental governance 
requires substantial investment in hierarchy and the EU plays a critical role in stimulating the 
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creation of that hierarchy. In the emergence of Croatian and Macedonian environmental governance 
we see the foundation of many network characteristics , as well as a declared preference for 
openness, accountability, representativeness, and participation. Both ĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ ?networks are 
hierarchical in respect of their emergence and operation, both are dominated by the environment 
ministry and non-state actors enjoyed limited influence and interacted sporadically with the policy 
process. In both countries the environment ministry acts as gatekeeper, the network is a response to 
engagement with the EU and policy complexity, and there has been no significant redistribution of 
power because of the emphasis establishing and developing on central capacity. Interview evidence 
identified the EU as the crucial influence on policy development and institutional creation by 
governments whose primary objective was accession. ŽŵƉĂƌĞĚƚŽƌŽĂƚŝĂ ?ƐDĂĐĞĚŽŶŝĂ ?Ɛemerging 
network was  sparse, reflecting the very recent emergence of environmentalism as a policy sector 
under the influence of the EU, and the environment ministry clearly dominates the emerging 
network. NGO involvement is even more limited, despite a government and NGO willingness to 
engage the priority is effectiveness, which means hierarchy.  
The cases have three common elements: first, the centrality of the environment ministry; second, 
weaknesses of capacity and capability (especially at the sub-national) and in civil society; and third, 
both experienced difficulties in creating and sustaining complex (especially horizontal) coordination 
and partnership working. Environmental policy is necessarily multi-level and multi-ĂĐƚŽƌďƵƚ ‘ŵƵůƚŝ-
ůĞǀĞů ?ĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞƐŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůƌelations not the  policy process and the key actors are the central 
ministries. In Croatia there are (admittedly contested) claims that even where participation 
developed , it was largely symbolic. In Macedonia the network was  even weaker and more 
fragmented, with a correspondingly greater role for the centre; both were the creation of, and are 
energised, by the EU seeking transposition and effective implementation, allied to promoting deep 
learning and the pluralisation of policy-making (Interview. DG Environment, 25 May 2009). An 
ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞŝƐĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚĂůƉŽůŝĐǇ ?ƐƚĞĐŚŶŝĐĂůĐŽŵƉůĞǆŝƚǇƚŚĂƚpulls towards networks, but 
enlargement (requiring an effective state) pulls sectoral organisation towards hierarchy, a pull 
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enhanced by shortages of capacities and capabilities, and weak civil societies in countries with a 
history of centralisation. Enlargement is therefore a process of state building whose character is 
determined and facilitated by the EU and in enlargement hierarchy is superior, being  concerned 
with creating effective governing capacity. In both countries hierarchy dominates and networks 
ƚƌĂŶƐŵŝƚƚŚĞĐĞŶƚƌĞ ?Ɛenvironmental influence outwards and downwards. 
There were  obvious differences between Croatia and Macedonia. Some can be ascribed to timing 
 ?ƌŽĂƚŝĂǁĂƐĨƵƌƚŚĞƌĂůŽŶŐƚŚĞƉĂƚŚƚŽhŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉ ? ?ƚŚĂ ƌŽĂƚŝĂ ?ƐƐƚĂƚĞǁĂƐĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚŵŽƌĞ
developed and capable than the Macedonian , as was Croatian civil society, which was reflected in 
ƚŚĞƌŽĂƚŝĂŶŶĞƚǁŽƌŬ ?Ɛrelative complexity. Both countries were  responding to the same EU policies 
and preferences and so we would expect Croatia and Macedonia to follow a broadly similar 
trajectory with the latter following the former. However, and this is central to the Europeanization 
hypothesis, this covergence  is filtered through national institutions and politics, which provide 
ample room for variation. The 2004 enlargement provided a broad indication to the Western 
Balkans of the likely evolution and contours of environmental governance and similarly Croatia 
ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĚĂŶŝŵĂŐĞŽĨDĂĐĞĚŽŶŝĂ ?Ɛfuture environmental governance as it progressed through 
enlargement towards membership. As the enlargement process procedes, the experience of Central 
and Eastern Europe and Croatia indicates ƚŚĂƚDĂĐĞĚŽŶŝĂ ?ƐĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚĂůŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞŶĞƚǁŽƌŬǁŝůů
become more complex in terms of both membership and interaction as policy is implemented and 
EU membership approaches. Equally, throughout this process we would expect an increased, albeit 
subordinate role, for civil society organisations in the environmental policy network. In both Croatia 
and Macedonia, actors recognised both the centrality of (for example) of the environment ministry 
during the enlargement process (a centrality that will continue after accession) whilst accepting the 
desirability and necesitty of greater civil society engagement and that this involvement would 
incease after accession. We would expect this general pattern to be repeated across the Western 
Balkans subject, of course, to national variations.  
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Networks are inevitable, an artefact of a technically and organisationally complex policy, but do not 
represent a significant move towards a new mode of governance. Rather,  ‘ŶĞƚǁŽƌŬ ? describes the 
structure in which environmental governance is conducted. Resource and power asymmetries, 
reinforced by the demands of enlargement, strengthen hierarchy and focus on central state 
capacity. In Croatia and Macedonia we see the enhancement of government because what existed 
differed markedly from what the EU required. Satisfying the h ?Ɛrequirements in the enlargement 
process , including effective environmental policy, requires, first and foremost, an effective state. 
Undeniably, participation has broadened and new ways of interacting have developed, or are 
developing, but environmental governance remained focussed on creating hierarchy to secure EU 
membership and satisfy the obligations of membership. To reiterate: enlargement is not concerned 
with creating networks but effective hierarchies, networks exist that are the by-product of complex 
policy. Participation has broadened, new  ways of interacting have emerged but the situational logic 
of enlargement means hierarchy is pre-eminent; networks are a functional response to policy 
complexity and not a new mode of governance.  
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